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European Integration and
the Nationalities Question
MICHAEL KEATING
European integration questions the relationship between nation and state. It under-
mines traditional sovereignty and weakens the need for statehood. Minority nation-
alist movements have in many cases adopted the European theme, adjusting their
ideology and strategy accordingly. Some have used “new regionalist” themes to
construct new systems of action below and beyond the state. Europe provides oppor-
tunities for territorial movements and grants some minority protections. There are
differences between Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe because of the
evolution of state structures. The prospective European constitution risks formaliz-
ing the European Union as a two-level game of states and the Union, with little room
for regional and minority claims.
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THE NATIONALITIES QUESTION
The “nationalities question,” or the lack of fit between state borders and
national groups, has been a recurrent feature of European politics since the con-
solidation of states in the nineteenth century. Such a misfit can arise because of
unification nationalism in fragmented territories, irredentism where a national
minority is detached from its external homeland,1 the existence of a minority
straddling borders of two states neither of which is its homeland, or the presence
of a nation contained within a wider state. This apposition and opposition
between state and nation has been transformed by the creation of an overarching
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but multifacted European polity above both. Some see this transnational integra-
tion as a way of ending the nationalities issue, itself the product of a phase of
modernity that is now being transcended.2 Others see it disappearing in a post-
nationalism, a Europe of the Regions, or a new medievalism.3 Increasingly, how-
ever, transnational integration and the rise of new or revival of old nationality
demands are seen as complementary processes; a reshaping of the connections
among territory, function, and identity; and a consequent restructuring of political
authority.
This article explores the links between substate nationality claims and Euro-
pean integration and the ways in which Europe can help by providing a “third
way” between national separatism and regional devolution. There are three levels
here. The first concerns the transformation of the state, in both functional and nor-
mative dimensions. The second is the transformation of nationality movements
towards doctrines of shared sovereignty, and the diffusion of liberal, democratic,
and inclusive norms within European political space. Functional change encour-
aged a “new regionalism” as state competences are shifted upwards and down-
wards, and substate and transnational territories emerge as a significant frame-
work for economic, social, and political change. Third, Europe opens up
opportunity structures for nationality movements. The impact of these changes on
national movements and their ability to exploit them varies. The European project
provides incentives to de-ethnicize, to forge a civic, territorial project, to play
down separatism and to enter into the game of multilevel politics; but not all
nationalist movements have been able or willing to adapt.
STATE TRANSFORMATION
European integration is part of a wider process of state transformation4 as well
as the unique process of polity building. It undermines the traditional identity
among sovereignty, territory, nationality, and function that is the essence of the
traditional nation-state and opens the way to other conceptions of political author-
ity and of public action.
First, European integration undermines state competences in matters such as
market unity and regulation, the currency, and external security.5 This reduces the
need for the traditional state apparatus and encourages a move towards new forms
of public policy instruments and of territorial autonomy. To the degree that func-
tions requiring a common regime are taken up to the European level, it also weak-
ens arguments against constitutional asymmetry within states.
Second, Europe challenges the doctrine of unitary and exclusive state sover-
eignty, by constituting a legal order, encouraging a legal and constitutional plural-
ism, in which distinct normative orders coexist.6 The demystification of state sov-
ereignty at the European level has led to a more general loss of ideological
hegemony and opened up a discursive space for doctrines of shared sovereignty
and constitutional pluralism within and across states.
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Third, European integration has undermined the old claim7 that democracy can
only function in nationally homogeneous territories, which provide a common
identity and trust. If Europe must manage with multiple demoi or without one at
all, then the same argument can be applied to multinational states within it.
Fourth, Europe, in the form of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights, separates human rights from nationality and citizenship, under-
mining state claims to be the bearers of universal rights or the only means to
secure them. This also undermines some powerful normative arguments against
asymmetrical government within the state.8
Fifth, European transnational regimes, notably but not exclusively the Euro-
pean Union (EU), have provided new opportunity structures beyond the state for
nationality movements, often in alliance with regions.
All this has provided incentives to national minority parties to rethink their ide-
ology and policy stance, to adapt to functional change, and to seek a place in the
new European architecture. Yet not all parties are able to make the necessary
shifts.
POST-SOVEREIGNTY
For some, like the Scottish National Party (SNP), European integration pro-
vides an external support system for an independence. Yet there is no provision in
European law for secession, and the prevailing international norms strongly dis-
courage it. Independence within Europe may represent an attenuated and less
risky form of independence, since many of the externalities are catered for, but it
does require secession.
More interestingly and subtly, in other cases it provides a new discursive space
within which to project nationality claims. It has allowed some movements to
abandon traditional claims for sovereign statehood and adopt a “post-
sovereigntist” position based on shared sovereignty and authority. Post-sover-
eignty9 does not mean the end of sovereignty, but rather its transformation so that
it is no longer monopolized by the state but becomes a claim to original authority,
which can be advanced by various actors and institutions and is intrinsically divis-
ible. This is a common theme of discourse among Europeanists and national
minorities and these two levels are increasingly linked so that the European dis-
course becomes part of the constitutive fabric of nationalist movements them-
selves.10 Apart from providing doctrines of limited and shared sovereignty, this
allows them to build or rebuild the nation internally by projecting it externally as
part of a European family.
By the 1990s, most nationalist parties had abandoned independence and sub-
stituted other formulations, emphasizing self-determination, insertion into
Europe, or asymmetrical federalism. Some parties have long been ambivalent.
Convergència i Unió in Catalonia has never supported independence, although
some of its militants do. Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya favors independ-
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ence only in the long term, as part of Europe of the Peoples transcending the old
model of statehood. The Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco
[PNV]) has independentist and nonseparatist strands but in 2003, the lehendakari
(Basque first minister) produced a plan providing for a “freely associated state”
linked to Spain and, directly, to Europe.11 In Flanders, Volksunie contained both
federalist and independentist elements until 2002 when it split into a separatist
and a post-sovereigntist party (Spirit). Plaid Cymru–Party of Wales has long been
ambivalent about the meaning of self-government but in 2001 explicitly stated
that in the European context, national independence was no longer needed. Even
within the SNP, there are many who favor the Catalan approach. The moderate
nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party of Northern Ireland is strongly
pro-European, and broader currents within both parts of Ireland have embraced
Europeanism as a means for transcending the division of Ireland.12
Across Eastern and Central Europe, the European theme has been taken up by
minorities as a substitute for irredentism and as a counter to the old revanchiste
attitudes found during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Silesian autonomists, long
torn between Polish and German identities, and with a history of irredentism and
expulsions, now stress the Europe of the Regions theme and autonomy within a
reconfigured Polish state.13 Hungarians in the Banat region of Romania empha-
size their essentially European character.14 The Democratic Alliance of Hungari-
ans in Romania, a center-right party linked to the Christian Democratic move-
ment and European People’s Party (EPP), also emphasizes its European mission,
which allows it to claim that Hungarians are both a constituent element of the
Romanian state and part of a wider Hungarian nation.15 The Party of Hungarian
Coalition in Slovakia, also linked to the EPP, dreams of a Europe of the “natural”
regions, reflecting culture and identity. Regionalists and minorities in Eastern
Europe have also drawn on the examples of mobilization in the West.16
CIVIC NATIONALISM
The normative dimension of Europe extends to a broader value framework,
founded on rejection of Fascism in the aftermath of the Second World War and
emphasizing democracy and tolerance. Nationalism was widely discredited, and
minority nationalisms in Flanders and in Brittany were tainted by the collabora-
tion of some of their members with Nazism. Since then, the European political
arena has been open to nationalist and regionalist movements that have empha-
sized territorial and inclusive nationalism and democracy, and not to those that
cleave to ethnic exclusiveness or racism. It has thus encouraged the growth of a
self-consciously “civic” nationalism.17 Such movements would include the SNP,
Plaid Cymru, Convergència i Unió, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, or
Volksunie/Spirit. The Basque PNV moved away quite early from the ethnic
exclusivism of Sabino Arana (though this element has never quite disappeared)
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and was an early convert to Europeanism, encouraged by its links with the interna-
tional Christian Democratic movement.18
Efforts by extreme right-wing or ethnically exclusive or racist parties to adapt
to Europe have been less successful, since they violate the founding norms of the
postwar European order. The Italian Lega Nord has gone through a series of pol-
icy realignments but for much of its history has emphasized the ability of Lom-
bardy and then Padania to operate in Europe, if only it were freed of the incubus of
the Mezzogiorno and the Italian state.19 By the mid-1990s, it had adopted a policy
of independence in Europe in which northern Italy could join the Euro, leaving
the south with the Lira. They failed to gain any allies among other regions and
nationalities, largely because of their racism and extremism, and found that the
Europe they sought to join was antagonistic to their values. In 1994 they were
forced out of the European Free Alliance.20 By 2001 they had changed their rheto-
ric to become strong defenders of the (albeit federalized) Italian state against
Europe. The Lega dei Ticinesi in Italian-speaking Switzerland takes much the
same line. In Flanders, the Vlaams Blok rejects civic nationalism in favor of ethnic
exclusiveness, favoring a European confederation of peoples, or ethnic states,
including Central and Eastern Europe. Yet despite its references to movements
like those in Scotland and Catalonia, it has failed to gain any allies and, like the
other extreme right parties, it has fallen back on an anti-European rhetoric.21
Radical left nationalists also tend to hostility to Europe, seeing it as a capitalist
club dominated by large states. So Herri Batasuna and its successors in the
Basque Country have no time for the EU, nor has Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland.
The Bloque Nacionalista Galego (of Galicia in Spain) for long purveyed a popu-
list anti-European rhetoric, portraying Galicia as even more peripheralized in
Europe than in Spain.22 Radical leftist groups in Brittany and in Occitania
(France) similarly excoriated the EC/EU. Until at least the 1970s, an ideological
underpinning for these radical leftist parties was provided by internal colonial-
ism, an extrapolation of the Third World struggles for liberation back to the impe-
rial countries of Europe. Gradually this theme lost its attraction or relevance and a
certain ideological shift took place, aided by the emphasis on social solidarity and
cultural pluralism in the European discourse of the 1980s. In some cases, includ-
ing the Galician and Breton movements, this led to a discovery of Europe and the
deployment of the theme of a Europe of the Peoples as an alternative to the states23
bringing them closer to Plaid Cymru and Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya.
A USABLE PAST
Nationality movements usually look back as well as forward, rooting their
claims and seeking legitimacy in a historic past that is itself continually rein-
vented. Yet the scope for invention is limited by the available materials, and by
their present resonance. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, national-
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ist movements often evoked a myth of ancient independence and precocious state-
hood, crushed by external repression. Sabino Arana anachronistically tried to
present the Basque provinces (initially just Vizcaya) as nation-states with full sov-
ereignty until broken by the Spanish state.24 Many contemporary nationality
movements, by contrast, have chosen to present themselves as the most European
of the Europeans and have rediscovered prestate traditions of shared sovereignty
and pactism, which lend themselves to the new European dispensation.25 Such
historical revisionism has been favored by the rediscovery of regional history26
and efforts to construct a history of Europe as opposed to its states.27 So Scottish
intellectuals have emphasized the lack of a tradition of unitary state sovereignty in
Scots law and philosophy28 and stress Scotland’s early European connections.
Catalans have taken as a reference point Catalonia’s status before 1714, as a self-
governing nation within a complex confederal arrangement standing between
“Spain” and Europe.29 Welsh nationalists emphasize community as an almost
mythical alternative to the classic form of nation. Basque nationalism has reinter-
preted the ancient rights or fueros of the historic territories as a form of pactism
based on shared sovereignty. Intellectuals in turn have used such old doctrines to
back claims for divided sovereignty within Spain and Europe.30
In other cases, such argumentation carries less weight. Breton claims that the
Revolution illegitimately broke the terms of the treaty of 1532 by which the prov-
ince was annexed to France,31 which clashes with the powerful image of the Revo-
lution itself and its democratizing myths. The Belgian lands have a usable past in
the form of the Burgundian and later imperial order, with its complex patterns of
rights and usages, and nationalists have long engaged in historiographical wars.32
Yet modern Flanders and Wallonia do not correspond to the historic units but are a
product of social and political modernization since the nineteenth century, and the
constitutional legacy is slight. Padania, the imagined nation of the Lega Nord, has
had to do with a concocted vision of itself as “the oldest community in Europe,”33
which convinces nobody.
In Central and Eastern Europe, a powerful theme after the fall of Communism
was the “return to Europe.” This is rather ambivalent, as it can refer to several dif-
ferent visions of Europe, past, present, and future. The availability of a usable past
also varies. Silesians are pressing into use their history as a borderland and
quintessentially European people as a way of resolving their confused national
identity question.34 Hungarians of Banat have drawn on the Habsburg cultural
heritage and their history of interethnic harmony.35 There is even a broader reas-
sessment of the Habsburg experience, which twentieth-century historiography
assumed had to break up as an inevitable consequence of democratization, since
the nationalities would only be fulfilled in their own state. Yet as early as 1848
there were thinkers advocating a new form of multinational order; the Czech
national leader Palacky went so far as to claim that if the Austrian empire did not
exist it would be necessary to invent it.36 The Hungarian Eötvos favored more
complex solutions still, retaining the historic Crownlands, which were not drawn
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along strictly ethnic lines, but providing for local self government within these.37
The Austro-Marxists Renner and Bauer advocated separating personal from terri-
torial nationality altogether, but with both coming under an overarching transna-
tional order.38 The Czech national leaders Masaryk and Benes favored self-gov-
ernment within the empire until the First World War and fear of German
domination rendered such schemes impossible.39 On the other hand, the Habsburg
legacy has negative connotations across much of the region, and the discourse of
“recovered” national statehood is a powerful theme; this is often combined with a
profound suspicion of federalism or any territorial recognition of minority
claims.40
It is hardly surprising that small nations and nationalities, with big and power-
ful neighbors, should not have developed doctrines of absolute state sovereignty,
preferring to put their faith in overarching and transnational security and market
regimes. This was the view of Masaryk41 and it finds an echo in other small
nations.42 The ideological expression of this sentiment and its associated tradi-
tions in parts of Europe provide an important doctrinal instrument in the emerging
complex European order. Self-determination in this context is less about estab-
lishing a separate state than about constituting the nation as the subject of political
claims, with certain inherent rights, which then need to be negotiated in a wider
order. In this way, premodern and postmodern conceptions of order meet. The
resulting doctrines, however, are often vague. Some, like the Catalan CiU, make a
virtue of this, arguing that their constitutional doctrines must evolve along with
Europe, while others postulate a utopian vision of a Europe of the Peoples in
which the state has withered away. In the meantime, nationality movements seek
to exploit existing opportunities in the form of regionalism, minority rights
regimes, and European constitutional reform.
THE NEW REGIONALISM
The impossibility of fitting the nation into the procrustean bed of the state or of
breaking states into territorially coherent national units is one of the most power-
ful criticisms of nationalist doctrine, Brubaker’s “architectonic illusion.”43 One
trend in analyses of late modernity detects an “end of territory”44 as the bonds of
identity, function, and space are severed. In this context, nationalities could be
reconceptualized as nonspatial cultural communities and endowed with various
forms of nonterritorial rights.45 The debate about nationalities and nationalism
then flows into the more general debate about multiculturalism and group rights.
Nationality claims, with their assertion of self-governing rights, however, are
more than mere claims for cultural recognition—indeed in some places, their cul-
tural content is rather small. They do still entail territorial autonomy and, indeed,
territory is in many ways becoming more important. Yet the significance of terri-
tory is changing as a result of functional transformations in the state and transna-
tional systems. This has allowed nationalist movements in Western Europe to
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embrace the “new regionalism,” which promises a territorial basis for self-rule but
without the exclusive connotations of territorial control implied in classical
nationalist doctrine.
The new regionalist paradigm embraces functional change, institution build-
ing, and new ways of conceptualizing territorial politics.46 The most important
strand concerns the importance of local and regional levels for economic develop-
ment and change, within global and European markets.47 Much of this literature
stresses also the social construction of the region and the role of norms, collective
identities, and shared memories in facilitating social cooperation and change.48
The key powers are no longer those held by the classic state, such as tariff policy
or even macro economic powers, but rather supply-side factors that stimulate
entrepreneurship and adaptation. Many of these powers, including education,
training, infrastructure, and planning, are held by substate governments. Reterri-
torialization is also occurring in other functional systems, including language and
culture, despite the availability of new forms of communication technology in
which distance is not a factor. This is because instruments like education and other
public services essential to maintaining a cultural community are usually territo-
rial, and because face-to-face communication remains important.
This territorialization of nationality and cultural claims is visible in Flanders,
where a linguistic group has become strongly territorialized, uniting previously
rather disparate provinces and localities. The autonomous community of the
Basque Country has emerged as an important unit, although based on three sepa-
rate historic territories, themselves part of a wider but territorially ill-defined
Basque cultural region. Wales, previously so divided between north and south as
to make any project of national self-government impossible, has found a new
unity as a European region.
This process has also involved institution building in state and civil society.
States have devolved to their constituent territories to varying degrees, both to
accommodate autonomist demands and for reasons of functional efficacy. Inter-
est groups and other elements of civil society have in turn adapted, to consolidate
the territory as a social, economic, and political system. Given the decline of
states’ abilities to manage their spatial economies, such regions are increasingly
competing with each other for investment, technology, and markets, within Euro-
pean and global space. It is not surprising then, that stateless nations have often
emerged as sites of such region building, with nation-building elites committed to
new regionalist theories about the ability of small units to compete in European
space autonomously. There is no consensus on what to call these new territorial
systems of action or on what the political implications are. Allen Scott writes of
“regional directorates.”49 The term “regional state” was coined by Kenichi Ohmae
in a rather breathless but acultural and ahistorical account of the emergence of
regional systems that are supposedly replacing the nation-state.50 The term is
taken up by Thomas Courchene51 and, in the context of the nationalities debate, by
Alain-G. Gagnon52 who sees the regional state as a way out of the Quebec
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dilemma between federalism and independence. Catalan authors, in recalling
Catalonia before 1714, have written of it as an incomplete state, but a state none-
theless.53 Georg Jellinek in the nineteenth century wrote of fragments of state,
entities that have some but not all of the characteristics of statehood.54
The possibility thus exists of territorially integrated nations and nationalities
gaining a substantial degree of functional autonomy within the new regional polit-
ical economy. Identity and culture, previously seen as an obstacle to moderniza-
tion, may be assets in the new development paradigm. This is not because territo-
ries like Scotland, Catalonia, or Flanders have any natural coincidence between
territory, identity, and functional systems, but because the evolution of the West-
ern European state and transnational order has encouraged stateless nation and
region builders to construct new systems of action. The new regionalism, with its
territorial focus, also encourages nationalists to adopt an inclusive or territorial
conception of the nation. So territorial devolution within the state and a role for
regions within the EU (see below) might be useful mechanisms for accommodat-
ing nationalities. Yet it may be difficult to apply the territorial solution in Central
and Eastern Europe, as recommended by Will Kymlicka55 and others, where the
nationalities have not undergone the same process of territorial consolidation.
FRAGMENTED TERRITORIES
Territory and nationality do not coincide where more than one group shares the
same territory, where one group straddles two territories, and in combinations of
these. One solution is deterritorialized forms of autonomy such as the Austro-
Marxist proposals for personal autonomy. Yet these, like consociational arrange-
ments, can be criticized for reifying an exclusive ethnicity and for undermining
territorial self-government, and there are few opportunities for nonterritorial
autonomy in Europe. A more promising idea is that of partially territorialized
solutions, in which territories are open rather than closed and their citizens can
profess different degrees of identity with it. A nationality can thus have a territo-
rial base without either monopolizing this territory or being confined to it. This
concords with modern understandings of space in political geography, allowing a
more open conception of the region, with less rigidly defined boundaries and
complex identities.56
Under the Habsburg Empire territorial autonomy through the Crownland sys-
tem corresponded rather imperfectly to the self-identifying nationality groups.
The Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, while providing for territorial
autonomy, allows people to identify variously with Ulster, Northern Ireland, all
Ireland, or the United Kingdom. In Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s, a
number of states57 passed or proposed laws giving special status to co-nationals in
neighboring countries. These could be read in two ways: as a provocative gesture
of extraterritorial jurisdiction and covert irredentism, or as a way of securing
nationality rights without moving borders. The Hungarian law of 2001 was par-
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ticularly controversial, since it came in a context in which some nationalist politi-
cians had talked of “reversing Trianon” and restoring the old Hungary. Romania
and Slovakia saw it as a vestige of old-fashioned ethnic nationalism, while the
Hungarian government defended it as an example of the multiple identity politics
possible in the new Europe of cultural diversity.58 Eventually the issue required
mediation through the Council of Europe. Ironically, Hungarian accession to the
EU means that the law will have to be abandoned since it will no longer be
possible to discriminate among European citizens, or indeed among third-party
nationals.
Europe provides powerful incentives for external homelands of minorities to
work together, where they are current or prospective members of European insti-
tutions. This has been a factor in Central Europe and in Cyprus where the prospect
of Turkish EU membership has provided an incentive for compromise. The Coun-
cil of Europe has also helped by abandoning its old doctrine that dual citizenship
is a source of conflict and, in the 1997 Convention on Nationality, actively encour-
aging it in certain circumstances.59 We may thus see a more open-ended or
“fuzzy” regionalism, in which a territory may be a homeland for a nationality
group, providing symbolic recognition and some public goods, while containing
pressures to move state borders. Such homelands may be states or, as in Catalonia
and the Basque Country, autonomous regions.
OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES
The emerging European order is complex and multilayered, with a range of
continental bodies, not all of which have the same territorial coverage. There is the
EU, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe, and a range of interstate and interregional bodies. Although the European
theme first entered the discourse of minority nationalists between the two world
wars with visions of a European federation of nations, the European Economic
Community attracted little enthusiasm among the minorities, who tended to see it
as remote, bureaucratic, and unsympathetic to nationality claims. Some vague
expressions of support for Europeanism remained, but without a clear institu-
tional expression. During the 1980s and 1990s, however, institutional incentives
emerged for minority parties to enter the European political game.60 Direct elec-
tions to the European Parliament from 1979 encouraged minorities to organize
and in 1981 the European Free Alliance was created linking minority and nation-
alist parties and creating a forum for dialogue and debate about building a new
Europe. The 1980s also saw a deepening of European integration and extension of
Community competences into new areas, together with a strengthening of its
supranational aspects and an institutionalization of the regional level. Notable
switchers from an anti-European to a pro-European position have been the SNP,
the Volksunie, Plaid Cymru, Union démocratique breton, and, to some degree, the
Bloque Nacionalista Galego.61
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In the late 1980s and early 1990s there was a flurry of interest in the concept of
a Europe of the Regions. Never clearly specified, this seemed to refer to an order
in which regions were recognized as a third level of government alongside states
and the EU itself.62 Regions and stateless nations were too heterogeneous ever to
fit into such a scheme, and in practice it evolved into a series of opportunities to
intervene in EU policy making, either by direct links to Brussels or via the Mem-
ber States. Nationalities may be able to adapt themselves to these regional oppor-
tunity structures, and to ally themselves to “non-national” and powerful regions;
at the same time it gives further incentives to territorialize nationality claims. A
clause in the 1992 Treaty on European Union allows regional ministers to repre-
sent Member States in the Council of Ministers where domestic law permits and
regional matters are at stake. This is applied in Germany, Austria, Belgium, and
the United Kingdom in various ways. In the United Kingdom, participation by
Scottish and Welsh ministers is at the discretion of the central government. In Ger-
many, the role of the Länder is entrenched and they participate by right. In Bel-
gium, the regions and communities have external competences corresponding
exactly to their internal competences, and the right to represent the state in the
Council of Ministers where these are concerned. While in Germany, the Länder
must come to a common position, in Belgium all the relevant governments must
agree, giving each a veto in matters falling within its jurisdiction. Spanish autono-
mous communities have not yet succeeded in gaining such rights. So, while Euro-
pean high policy making remains largely intergovernmental, there are mechan-
isms for regions to act, provided they first achieve victory in domestic
constitutional arenas.
A lot of attention has been given to the Structural Funds as a means of giving
regions access to Brussels, a partnership with the Commission, and a source of
funding independent of Member States. In practice, this field is intergovernmen-
tal and regions have no means of getting money directly from Brussels. The Funds
are, rather, an arena for symbolic politics, in which regional politicians can claim
to have established a funding link to Brussels, while the EU can claim credit for
looking after vulnerable regions. In this way, they have helped bring Europeanism
and regionalist and minority claims further together.
A more direct form of access is the Committee of the Regions. This has proved
a disappointment to regionalists and minority nationalists because of its weak
powers and lack of resources and because it represents all levels of sub–Member
State government equally. Frustrated at having to share a place with municipal
governments, the strong regions, stateless nations, and federated units launched
an initiative for the Regions with Legislative Powers, or Constitutional Regions,63
seeking a recognition of their place in the European constitution. Although these
do not always correspond to cultural or national regions or minorities, there is
enough of an overlap to make common cause among German Länder and Italian
regions, Scotland, Wales, Flanders, and Catalonia in asserting the need for a rec-
ognized third level within the European architecture. While they have as yet
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achieved few concrete results, they have created another discursive space in
which dialogue and exchange takes place about the building of Europe. Such dia-
logue is also pursued by the many regional offices in Brussels, which have
become part of the policy community and an important link in the exchange of
ideas and policy initiatives. Another arena is the Council of Europe, whose Com-
mittee of Regional and Local Authorities has been divided into two chambers, for
the regions and the municipalities. This has produced a European Charter of Local
Self Government and a draft European Charter of Regional Self Government.
An important opportunity lies in the transformation of borders. Borders
remain important as expressions of state sovereignty and are for the first time gen-
erally uncontested; but they are losing their functional significance. These twin
changes have encouraged new forms of cross-border penetration and coopera-
tion, which are no longer automatically seen as threats to the state. As empirical
studies have shown, identities in border regions are typically complex, with indi-
viduals identifying both with their respective states and with a transborder nation-
ality or ethnic group, defying a simple geographical definition of identity.64 Per-
meable borders allow a renegotiation of these and the emergence of new forms of
layered identity. Others have talked of porous or “fuzzy borders.”65 On a more
concrete level, there is scope for cross-border functional cooperation on eco-
nomic, environmental, and cultural matters, allowing more expression for the
new regionalism. The Council of Europe produced the Madrid Convention, which
provides a legal instrument for cross-border partnership. The EU has a substantial
program of cross-border partnerships under the INTER-REG initiative, which by
the end of the 1990s was active across every border within the EU and with the
candidate countries as well. Experience of cross-border partnership has been
mixed, since difference in legal systems and political incentives, together with the
tendency of regions and localities to be in competition for investment, have often
stymied genuine partnership.66 The effects on identity are also subtle. There are
few instances of border communities abandoning their state identities to find a
common ethnic or national one. Cooperation has, however, helped redefine
borders as complex zones in which multiple identities can be expressed and
negotiated.
These regional opportunities are closed to nonterritorialized minorities, which
instead look to rights protection. Until the end of the Cold War, Europe lacked a
common minority rights regime, and efforts to apply the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights to the collective rights of minorities were
rebuffed.67 Since the 1990s, European institutions have gradually and hesitantly
been building a minority rights regime, but this has three key features. It tends to
focus on the rights of individuals belonging to minorities rather than the minori-
ties themselves; it emphasizes access to services and cultural guarantees rather
than political autonomy, especially territorial autonomy; and it works though
states, allowing them to define the problem and control access to European means
of redress. A Charter of Regional and Minority Languages was adopted by the
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Council of Europe in 1992, with reservations by several states, including the
United Kingdom and France; eventually France failed to ratify it. The enforce-
ment mechanism is a three-yearly report to the Council of Ministers.68 More
ambitious is the 1995 Framework Convention on National Minorities, designed to
be adopted in appropriate form by signatory states but without direct application.
It does not define or recognize minorities, but rather addresses the rights of indi-
vidual members of minorities, determined by a mixture of self-designation and
objective criteria. Matters covered include the use of language, education, the
media, public administration, commercial signs, and cross-border contacts. The
Convention stands out among the European instruments for its intention to protect
and preserve the minority communities themselves, so going beyond the mere
prohibition of discrimination. On the other hand, signatory states themselves
were allowed to designate their own minorities before ratification. So Estonia
included only its own citizens in its scope, refusing to recognize Russians who
had not met its strict citizenship requirements; Russia’s own reservation specifi-
cally aimed to deny this. Luxembourg, worried about the rights of immigrants and
their descendants, confined its protection to minorities who had been present for
“several generations” and then declared that, on this criterion, there were no
minorities in Luxembourg. Other states, however, took the matter more seriously
and many national minorities were expressly singled out for protection.
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has a High
Commissioner for National Minorities. Originally intended as a trouble-shooting
operation in actual or potential conflicts, the role has extended to the realm of
minority rather than purely individual rights. It has so far been confined entirely to
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The OSCE also enters into the field
for minority protection through the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe.69
The EU has been reluctant to be drawn into questions of minority rights but it
has proved impossible to remain entirely aloof. An article in the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union (Maastricht) pledged support for cultural diversity, and the European
Parliament used this to establish a Bureau of Lesser Used Languages in Dublin.
Negotiations for the admission of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
brought the issue to the fore, and the Copenhagen criteria of 1993 included
respect for minorities. Regular accession reports note progress on the issue and
call for change where necessary. There has been some movement towards the
acceptance of group rights, perhaps motivated by security and immigration con-
siderations, notably the position of Russians in the former Soviet republics. Dis-
crimination against Roma also featured quite prominently as an issue.
The EU’s approach has often relied on principles and processes from the
Council of Europe and the OSCE, with their prior experience.70 So it has pressed
candidate countries to adopt the Framework Convention on National Minorities,
widely accepted within the existing Member States, rather than the more contro-
versial European Convention on Regional and Minority Languages.71 The 1995
Stability Pact (Plan Balladur), in which the EU encouraged candidate countries to
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settle minorities and border issues among themselves, was formally sponsored by
the OSCE.72 This is a patchwork approach but, by individual initiatives linked
across the various institutions, a minority rights regime of sorts has come into
being.73 Accession will be a key test of this regime, since the Amsterdam Treaty of
1997 incorporating the Copenhagen criteria into the acquis de l’Union, left out
the minority rights clauses.74 This implies that, after accession, either the EU will
cease to monitor minority rights in the new Member States, or it will have to adopt
a new instrument to monitor them in the existing Member States as well.
STATE ADAPTATION
Europe thus allows a loosening of state control and the externalization of pre-
viously centralized functions, but the response depends on adaptation of states
themselves, which remain gatekeepers between nationalities and Europe. Bel-
gium has generally bent to the process of integration by handing powers down to
the communities and regions and upwards to Europe. At times it looks as though
the state itself will disappear, although it is precisely the ability to externalize
problems that allows it to stay together in some form. The United Kingdom has
turned itself into an asymmetrical multinational state. It is as though, never having
gone through the national revolution and retaining many features of an ancien
régime, it has been able to jump from a premodern to a postmodern state form
directly. Europe has helped here in various ways, despite the prevailing Euro-
scepticism. The European framework is one factor that made possible the Good
Friday agreement in which both the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland
put their claims over Northern Ireland into abeyance.75 It allowed a settlement for
Scotland in 1998 that was much less set about with safeguards and restrictions
than that proposed in 1978. States based upon Napoleonic principles of unity and
uniformity have found it more difficult to adapt, despite being in general pro-
European. These include the obvious example of France as well as Italy and even
Spain, where the present government has tended to react to the challenge to its
sovereignty by more aggressive assertion of its remaining prerogatives and a
resistance to further devolution. In Central and Eastern Europe, there is a wide-
spread fear of separatism and distrust of federal solutions as states, having just
recovered their independence, are reluctant to lose it. Yet here too there are differ-
ences. Romania has tended to emphasize the French model of unitary citizenship
as the basis for democracy. Hungary, mindful of the large number of Hungarians
in neighboring states, has argued for a looser and more complex idea of national-
ity and citizenship. Poland, living with the memory of partition, has stressed
national unity and sought to restrict regionalism to a limited functional type, not
based on historic regions and framed within the Polish state rather than at a
European level. States have differed in the extent to which they have allowed their
regions to operate within Europe.
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THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE
Much has been written about multilevel governance in Europe, about plural-
ism and the complexity of policy-making structures.76 Yet without a constitution,
it is feared, Europe lacks a clear normative basis and becomes merely an arena for
group competition. This applies equally to the nationalities question, where we
are witnessing a plethora of claims to self-determination, historic and present
rights, and original sovereignty. Such a complex normative order requires a new
form of constitutional thinking, adapted to a world in which the old triad of nation,
territory, and sovereignty can no longer be taken for granted.
Constitutionalism has increasingly been detached conceptually from the state,
with an appreciation that constitutions may exist at multiple levels and that
constitutionalism itself may be as much a process as a final and definitive set of
rules. The expression “metaconstitutionalism” has been coined for the realm in
which the various constitutional visions meet and are negotiated.77 Within such a
framework, a constitutional pluralism is possible, in which various forms of order
and sovereignty claims can coexist, including those of shared and divided sover-
eignty. There are two versions of arguments about divided sovereignty. One is to
the effect that sovereignty is still in principle indivisible, but that, since a number
of actors at different levels are making claims to it, we have not alternative to com-
promise among them. Politics thus comes in where constitutional theory falls
down. So the Basque Nationalists claim that, since the 1978 Spanish constitution
did not recognize their original rights and did not gain the support of an absolute
majority of Basques in the referendum, it is not legitimate.78 This does not stop
them working within it. There is an unresolved intellectual and legal question
about the source and nature of sovereignty in Scotland, but it does not stop politics
proceeding. In an open constitutional order, we can live with many of these anom-
alies, and it is often preferable not to resolve them. The other version is to see sov-
ereignty not as a claim to the monopoly of authority, but rather as a claim to an ele-
ment of original authority (that is not derived from a higher authority), but which
recognizes the existence of other sources of original authority that necessarily and
inherently limit each other. This is more consistent with the historic doctrines
being refurbished in the stateless nations of Europe. A European constitution-
alism is thus possible in which there is a shared European level, marked by com-
mon values and equal rights, within which highly asymmetrical arrangements are
possible reflecting the status of different nationalities, states, and regions.
This would require a European constitution that was strong enough to provide
an overarching framework, but flexible enough to allow diversity within it. A
European Union built on the lines of the traditional nation-state would fail to meet
the need for the same reasons as the states have. At the other extreme, a Europe
functioning merely as a holding company, a market order, or a convenience for
externalizing difficult problems would not sustain the common values and consti-
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tutional order in which pluralism is possible. There may be an emerging constitu-
tional practice, as we have seen in reviewing the various institutions and strategies
in Europe, but there is no overall framework for managing the new national
complexity.
The debates around the Convention on the Future of Europe and its draft con-
stitution provide some evidence for this. The national/regional question was not a
priority in the Convention, which was not tasked with proposing a new statute for
nations and national minorities. Nor could it challenge the sovereignty of states
and their authority head on. On the contrary, the debates followed a logic in which
authority is divided in complex ways between European and state-level institu-
tions. So nationalities and regions must find their niche in a Europe of the states
rather than dreaming of their disappearance in favor of a utopian Europe of the
Peoples.79 Yet the various visions of Europe on offer provide more, or less, space
for the accommodation of nationalities. An intergovernmental Europe based on
the existing states clearly offers the least scope for stateless nationalities. An inte-
grated but centralized and uniform Europe would offer little more. So regions and
nationalities have pressed for an integrated Europe but one that is decentralized
and pluralist. In this way, the pro-Europeanism of the national minorities and
stateless nations can serve as a means to legitimize the European project itself by
linking it to local mobilization and identity. Rather than Europe seeking its own
separate demos, therefore, it can be the framework for multiple demoi, themselves
constitutive, along with the state, of a larger political community. Such a dispen-
sation is closer to the idea of pluralistic federalism80 than of classical uniform
federalism on the U.S. model.
The clarification and demarcation of roles and responsibilities, however,
threaten to reduce the space available for regions and nationalities to those speci-
fied in the new constitution. Indeed, the very process of constitution making may
reduce those areas of uncertainty in which new forms of authority might be nego-
tiated, and Europe could end up as an obstacle to new forms of accommodation. In
the last major treaty revision, at Maastricht, opportunities were created that Mem-
ber States could use at their discretion (discussed above). In the present constitu-
tional round, there seems less willingness to allow such differentiation. The
majority in the Convention and in the Committee of the Regions even refused to
distinguish between federated units and devolved national parliaments, on the one
hand, and municipal government on the other. The Flemish government and the
Catalan Convention on Europe proposed that it be possible to divide a Member
State’s vote in the Council of Ministers, but this was a nonstarter, as was the Euro-
pean Free Alliance for “internal enlargement” in which stateless nations could
become full members of the EU. The Basque government proposed expanding on
the Lamassoure proposal81 whereby regions could become partners of the Union,
to provide for the Basque Country to become an “associated state.” Yet the origi-
nal Lamassoure idea, which was already a long way from this, was further diluted
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to a form of administrative decentralization. Nor has the EU agreed to allow states
to differentiate internally in their application of EU directives the way they are
allowed in many cases to differentiate between themselves. The numerous excep-
tions in the existing treaties to accommodate regions, including the Canaries, the
Azores, and the Åland islands, are not to be generalized. Even the proposal to rec-
ognize a category of regions with legislative powers fell victim to a combination
of those who considered that all regions were the same and those who thought that
they were so different that they were impossible to categorize.
CONCLUSION
European integration has thus affected the nationalities question at three lev-
els, that of the state, that of the nationalities, and in the European arena itself. Yet
its impact is two sided. On the one hand, the increasing language of pluralism and
divided sovereignty provides a discursive space for new authority claims. There is
a trend among the nationalities movements to adopt a post-sovereign stance; to
express a civic, inclusive form of nationalism; and to emphasize their territorial
basis. This has tamed and restrained nationalism, although some ethnically exclu-
sive and separatist movements still exist. States remain the obstacle to utopian
visions of a Europe of the Peoples, but some have adapted to the new pluralism
more than others. Europe, by externalizing common functions, permits a greater
asymmetry within states. The European institutional structure furnishes a set of
opportunities for nonstate actors to intervene, gain recognition, build systems of
action, and secure protection. On the other hand, the concrete opportunities avail-
able within Europe are limited and rather disparate. Europe creates spaces for
more diversity, but many of its institutional and policy initiatives assume a homo-
geneous substate level of authority and identity.82 An intergovernmental EU, with
the states taking a restrictive line on what their substate governments can do, will
place a premium on becoming a state even if this should be the second choice of
the nationalities themselves.
So far, a gradual evolution has allowed Europe and the nationalities to adapt in
tandem, exploring new forms of political order. Formulas such as the “regional
state,” “fragment of state,” or “incomplete state” have been criticized for their
implication that they are somehow unfinished, but this very characteristic marks
the evolution of Europe itself. An open and loose form of constitutionalism would
allow this process to continue, making adjustments where necessary. An effort to
close the process or to fix the status, categories, and competences of Europe,
Member States, and nationalities and regions would risk re-creating the type of
misfit that has caused such problems in the past.
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